Hi all,
I’m Valdorff, a hyperactive Rocket Pool (RP) community member that serves on the ~volunteer Incentives Managemenet Committee (IMC). I’d like to respond to this twice, once as an RP IMC Member and once personally.
As an RP IMC member
From the IMC point of view, this is essentially rolling back to the previous state before veTokenomics. We had a negotiated coincentive deal with PCS to get us higher efficiency. That was then replaced by veTokenomics – it turned out that efficiency has actually been even higher most of the time. This proposes to go back to the earlier state, which I suspect will be less attractive for us compared to alternatives.
When veTokenomics were proposed, there was a strong suggestion that RP should hold and use veCAKE directly. If we had built a strategy around that, I am sure we’d feel quite rugged here.
I would like to push back on the presentation of “share of emission vs share of burn”. When you go to a veTokenomics model, you expand your ecosystem to include the bribe markets. People hold veCAKE in order to get the bribes, so not including them (alongside burn) is disingenuous. A quick calculation finds that RP’s rETH-ETH bribes during the table’s time period were worth about 79.8k CAKE, so it’s certainly a relevant number next to the 6.6k burned CAKE.
Personally, not as an RP IMC member
I think @hubert makes sense talking about the extra tokens and considering caps. @phn1990 makes a similar but more dynamic suggestion for capping – this would essentially limit how much a pool could take on in external bribes (inconvenient, including for RP) but would ensure CAKE is spent on the highest burning pools (nice alignment).
I am concerned that the majority of the “issues” being raised are wholly predictable for veToken models. This was not an implementation pursuing virgin ground – many protocols had gone ahead and I don’t think the current state is a surprise. If “veTokenomics roughly as expected” is unacceptable, it’s unclear to me why it was put in place.
There are people and protocols that made long term decisions based on veTokenomics. They were given a narrative of long-term alignment. Getting a new narrative of long-term alignment without the support of the previous set of “long-term aligned” folks is quite rough. I expect this to cause long term damage to potential partner trust.
The large CAKE lock just ahead of this proposal is rough. The most aggressive take was presented by Curve’s founder and has been shared above by @Dayronpro. I won’t take a stance here (I am simply not knowledgeable enough), but the perception here is brutal. This also damages long term trust.