This is a proposal draft that comes after thoughtful consideration, supporting such ideas instead of a one-size-fits-all approach like the kitchen’s.
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Adding these points from Cakepie team to enhance my proposal:
Reward Voters with Fee Sharing: Allocate a portion of the fees generated by a pool to veCAKE holders who vote for that pool. This incentivizes directing emissions toward pools with higher trading volumes.
Introduce Exit Flexibility with Penalties: Enhance veCAKE’s design by allowing early exits with penalties. These penalties could be burned or redistributed, offering users more flexibility while preserving the tokenomics integrity.
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I have added the “penalty” to my current proposal. (refer to “comment section” of my post)
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An argument for being against the proposal to end veCAKE:
There were 14 million CAKE excluded from the supply forever(Cakepie and Stake Dao).
These CAKE will return.
This cancel out all the burning since sep 23.
The kitchen’s proposal goes against what the kitchen says!
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I am TOTALLY AGAINST the following items transcribed from the CAKE TOKENOMICS 3.0 PROPOSAL:
In my opinion, the proposed changes will impact the price of the $CAKE token, despite the intention being exactly the opposite.
If it is not possible to remove these three items from the aforementioned proposal, I urge the community to VOTE FOR THE ENTIRE REJECTION OF CAKE TOKENOMICS PROPOSAL 3.0.
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We welcome a discussion on refining veCAKE to better serve PancakeSwap’s long-term goals.
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Posting in text format, for Google indexing:
As many maybe know, ve-tokenomics reason to exist is to prevent governance attacks, making decision makers take long-term responsibility over their actions.
Can this be bypassed? Yes, if lock rules themselves are upgradable by governance.
Do we have a precedent? Yes, now we do.
CAKE insiders lock some CAKE tokens and, essentially, erase all the governance rights and rewards rights from existing veCAKE holders. Governance attack at its finest.
Best part? They also force-unlock their tokens once the proposal has passed, because governance (in which they just got rights by locking) can do it.
So: upgradability is a bug. Don’t make your veGovernance upgradable, especially the lock part.
Source: X/@ newmichwill (cannot post images here)
Would love to see a response from @ChefMaroon
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3 measures to improve veCAKE system!
The kitchen says that there is a problem with the efficiency of voting incentives.
In other words, many pools that do not contribute volume are over-incentivized.
The truth is, however, that pools that contribute a lot to volume already have excellent liquidity and low slippage. Therefore, receiving more CAKE allocation would not necessarily mean an increase in liquidity, and this increase in liquidity would not necessarily be reflected in better prices or more volume. Is the problem with PCS low TVL in BNB, BTC, ETH, CAKE, etc.? Definitely not. So more CAKE for core pools can be CAKE wasted. In fact, the kitchen already has mechanisms in place to guarantee incentives for these main pools.
But in fact, voting incentives can be improved.
The first step is for the kitchen to have an allocation of CAKE that is used not to boost farms directly but to provide voting incentives for veCAKE. Then, every epoch, the kitchen can dynamically allocate more voting incentives to the pools that the kitchen thinks need to receive more allocation in that epoch.
Second measure, a dashboard that integrates all voting incentives from all platforms in the pancakeswap vecake ecosystem and that pancakeswap organizes voting incentives together with other protocols.
Finally, the lack of flexibility has been criticized. Here I make the third measure: impose the possibility of unlocking CAKE with penalties such as burning part of the CAKE. Or even the possibility of evolving to a ve(3,3) system where we can negotiate our locked positions, etc. There are a series of protocols making a series of improvements such as shadow, pendle, aerodrome, etc. PancakeSwap can innovate.
Answering false arguments:the kitchen’s proposal goes against the kitchen’s announced objectivest
Another argument that is often used is: “I don’t like mcake, sdcake, ascake, etc. I don’t like subdaos, etc.” Ok, those who don’t like the current system allow them not to use them. They are not obliged to use these systems if pancakeswap organizes voting incentives for those who have vecake.
Someone counters by arguing: “but I just want to hold cake”. Ok, you can buy CAKE and keep it in your wallet. Nothing stops you from doing that. You cant need lock your CAKE right now to enjoy deflation.
And they continue: “but I want deflation”.
CAKE have been deflationary since sep 23. With the kitchen’s proposal, the real deflation that we have had since the deflationary era is killed by releasing more than 14 million CAKE that were blocked forever. Furthermore, the kitchen’s proposal announces a burning proposal that is smaller than what we have today and also cuts the income for holders. In other words, it is a brutal income cut for all CAKE holders.
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buy cake, lock for 4 years, and vote against proposal
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My last comment on this. Allow me to unlock and leave, will support the original proposal. Do not want to be part of a sick ecosystem where the biggest holder is ruling and draining it´s mother base PCS and when it comes to voting same biggest holder is blaming 25M wallet for cheating… realy sick and shows how cakepie is parasiting on PCS, creating “value” out of thin air… luna2 if you want. Disappointment what became from a dex after 4y of incompetency and greed. Now tokenomy 3.0 comes to remedy the damages… who the hell is having 3rd tokenomy model out there? How many are in the pipeline? Let´s vote as soon as possible sir.
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And you guys say: “The power is with the community”? Really? Have you actually looked at the tokenomics of CKP?
50% is in the hands of Magepie. So if they hold half the governance power, how exactly is the community in charge?
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Streets will never forget chef Mochi 
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We would like to clarify a few misconceptions regarding CKP tokenomics:
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Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL) for the CKP-WBNB pair does not carry any governance power. It exists solely to support market health and liquidity depth, not for voting.
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The Magpie treasury is governed by vlMGP holders, not by the Magpie or Cakepie team. All decisions regarding treasury activity and incentive distribution go through onchain votes by the community.
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The 20% reserved allocation is designated for long-term strategic initiatives/investment. It is not in circulation, has never been sold, and does not participate in governance.
Magpie is built on a model of shared ownership and decentralized coordination. Any claim suggesting otherwise misrepresents the structure we’ve intentionally built to empower stakeholders, not centralize control.
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This proposal penalizes those who built and believed in veCake. Another detail: Binance Wallet is restricted in many countries, this is not included, this is excluded. It is not fair for PCS to make arbitrary decisions without thinking about the loss of those who believed in its previous roadmap with a long-term commitment. You are always changing direction and the only one who pays is the community. When will you look at your first supporters?
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In fact, if Pancake communicated with the community, it would have a chance to coordinate forward-looking proposals. However, the 25m lock-up of the Binance-related address the day before and the proposal’s tendency towards centralized governance turned into a public relations crisis.
Emission reduction and burning are definitely good, but we need to coordinate the improvement of the veToken model and find a balance point. If we want to exit, we also need to coordinate an exit mechanism with subDAO to protect the rights of the most people.
However, in terms of governance, whether it is necessary to simultaneously abandon the lock-up time weight of veToken is worth reconsidering, because it will make governance manipulation easier. Whales can buy, vote, and sell after voting for their own interests, which may not be aligned with the overall interests of the community.
Reconsidering this proposal and listening to the community is the right thing to do.
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Are we going to vote for this proposal or are you just going to implement it?
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Transparency. It’s all.
They will give all locked CAKE tokens back, so i support this proposal to more healthy CAKE token future.
For Magpie and Cakepie CKP Token Side:
When mCake’s peg dropped to 0.60, we asked for support and sacrifice from CKP, but CKP holders selfishly refused. Now, after the PancakeSwap update, CKP has become functionally useless and they’re expecting help from mCake. If there was no support for the mCake peg back then, we don’t care about CKP now. As mCake holders, we will redeem our CAKE 1:1 and I oppose any support being given to CKP.
From the beginning CKP was a mistake. Look at Stake DAO and Astherus, they don’t have another token, they using sdCake and asCake for bribes. So they don’t need to deal problems like Cakepie. Again Magpie Team fault; another token.
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You want to turn things around by any means… You decided to implement Ve and chose Cakepie. Vetokenomic works, so go and ask all the protocols in the DEFIWAR. Cakepie beat you at your own game, and now you want to take it out. Does the current model generate profits? Well, answer for yourself with the photo below. Here’s the data.
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After careful consideration, I’ve changed my mind.
The proposal is good but everything around it has been bad (lack of convos with veCAKE aggregators, barely no communication with community, shady governance manipulations, changing core rules again at the cost of the community, etc…)
I’m a pleb but I will vote against it.
Kitchen can’t keep playing the community like that.
Best regards
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