I’m just shocked how a team can just take out and destroy the most involved part of the community that worked through the DAO. And not even blink an eye. Just take and destroy people’s investments. It’s just terrible.
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Regarding
For veCAKE linked to veCAKE managers (e.g., CakePie, StakeDAO, Astherus), users must wait for the partner veCAKE managers to implement a withdrawal process. We will whitelist addresses associated with those partners, but please note that we cannot directly process partner token withdrawals.
i wonder if there is risk that partners wont implement the withdrawal process.
how can they call them partners, after what they propose to do. Partners are not killed for their own gain.
As far as I like how this proposal benefits $CAKE I have to admit I fully agree with you regarding your takes on community trust & the way governance seems to be manipulated lately.
Unfortunately it’s not the first time PancakeSwap change core tokenomic and hurts it’s own community. If this happens again I wish it’s the last time…
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This will be the last time, because it will be impossible to destroy something that no longer exists.
(Personal thought) Cakepie has been quite supportive in PCS ecosystem ever since veCake is established. With veCake domination around 50% (prior to the 25M prompt lock right before this proposal), Cakepie never manipulated our governance right over PCS, everything went through DAO (vlCKP voting for any proposal from PCS, we’ve also been quite supportive and cooperative with the kitchen).
Kitchen’s goal is for Cake deflation, and improve reward efficiency, Cakepie is definitely glad to help and I believe this could be done through different mechanisms rather than just killing veCake directly.
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Gauge can be improved as a hybrid mode to consider veCake votes with proper caps along with kitchen’s agile decision due to market, trading volume etc. This hybrid mode not only keeps a certain level of emission control transparency, but still allowing Kitchen to achieve better reward efficiency agile
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Lock mechanism has been proved successfully in defi history. This not only incentivized long-term holders but also reducing selling pressure. As kitchen’s goal is to deflate CAKE, I don’t understand why increasing Cake circulating on the market when trying to deflate Cake. Isn’t CAKE price more sustainable if whatever locked kept locked when deflation happening?
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The Flexible Voting isn’t good idea. We’ve seen many governance attacks in the defi history that’s why ve-model can prevent short term holder impact long term decision. I’m not sure what’s the reason going back on this.
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It’s a good idea to make IFO (and even TGE with Binance wallet) easier by simply use Cake. But there is no need to kill veCake to achieve this. A better way can be even grant veCake wrapper (like mCake, stCake, asCake) access to IFO and binance wallet TGE . This helps PCS ecosystem to blackhole more cake, stable the peg, introduce more defi lego opportunity.
Kitchen aim to make PCS a more inclusive, decentralized platform, but I feel this proposal is killing the PCS ecosystem and making PCS less decentralized. Around 1.5 year ago, Cakepie had successful IFO on PCS, and we’ve been building and supporting since then. It’s really sad that this proposal came out without any prior communication with us. Nothing is perfect, but it’s important to improve and fix together, rather than just excluding someone has been building around PCS and BNB chain.
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As a loyal member of this community and as a long term investor since 2021, I have accumulated Cake both in its up and low. I have trusted the DEX no matter what. Sometimes back, the DEX proposed VeCake and gauges and directed long term holders to community driven projects like Cakepie whose only job is to accumulate more cake and empower the system and I am not alone. As a result I have invested significant amount in CKP to empower it to accumulate more Cakes. Because of people like me, who have risked it all for this platform , PCS has finally won the DEX war against giant like Uniswap. Yesterday, after reading this proposal I am at a loss of words. I cant believe, that something sinister like this can actually come out of the kitchen. I strongly oppose this proposal. This proposal if passed will destroy people and long term investors who has invested in projects like Cakepie on PCS direction. It will also raise question about the ethics on which the PCS team is working who have disregared their community of long term investors. This loss of trust cant be mitigated with any thing and this cake system will get ruined slowly. This proposal is already gaining very bad publicity for the protocol as competitors are spreading news like Pancakeswap is trying to kill its community for the big players. This bad publicity will slow down the pace of the ever increasing community which will later create its own problem. Thats why I am requesting the Chefs to kindly reconsider the things that are at stake because you are one step away from destroying this wonderful platform.
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For people who don’t use subDAOs, this is a proposal that could increase the value of CAKE, so they can support it. However, for those who do use subDAOs, it results in losses, which is why they oppose.
This proposal aims to eliminate veCAKE and Gauges Voting, reduce CAKE emissions, and target an annual deflation rate of about 4%. I understand this as pointing to a situation where opinions are divided between those who don’t use subDAOs and those who do. Let’s break this down from that perspective.
Benefits for People Not Using SubDAOs
For CAKE holders who don’t use subDAOs (e.g., those simply holding the token or not participating in veCAKE or liquidity provision), a proposal like Tokenomics 3.0 could increase CAKE’s value in the following ways:
• Reduced Supply: Lower CAKE emissions would limit the total amount of tokens entering the market, creating deflationary pressure. If demand remains steady, this could drive up the token’s price.
• Long-Term Value Growth: Eliminating veCAKE and Gauges Voting could reduce complexity and reliance on subDAOs, enhancing PancakeSwap’s simplicity and transparency. This might boost the project’s overall credibility and adoption, positively impacting CAKE’s value.
• Increased Fairness: Those not using subDAOs often find themselves at a disadvantage in the current system regarding voting power and reward distribution. If this proposal passes, the bias toward large holders and subDAOs would decrease, relatively improving the position of regular holders.
For these reasons, people not relying on subDAOs can clearly support it as “a proposal that enhances CAKE’s value.”
Losses for People Using SubDAOs
On the other hand, for those actively using subDAOs (e.g., Cakepie or Stake DAO), the proposal could lead to losses for the following reasons, prompting their opposition:
• Reduced Rewards: SubDAOs offer additional token rewards through bribe markets, a significant income source for veCAKE holders. Abolishing veCAKE and Gauges Voting would eliminate this revenue stream, lowering yields for subDAO users.
• Loss of Voting Power: Holding veCAKE allows users to vote on subDAO-related gauges and control CAKE emission allocations. Removing this system would diminish subDAOs’ influence and weaken existing positions.
• Ecosystem Impact: SubDAOs support PancakeSwap’s external partnerships and diversity. Their reduction could limit indirect benefits (e.g., access to new projects or additional revenue sources) that subDAO users currently enjoy.
In short, for subDAO users, this proposal clearly results in losses due to the erosion of their current revenue models and governance advantages.
Background of the Divide and Possible Solutions
This split in opinions highlights the existence of groups with differing interests within the PancakeSwap community. Those not using subDAOs prioritize “long-term token value,” while subDAO users focus on “short-term profitability.”
To mitigate this conflict while balancing decentralization and growth, the following compromises could be considered:
• Gradual Transition: Instead of immediately abolishing veCAKE and Gauges Voting, phase them out over several months to a year. This would give subDAO users time to adjust their strategies.
• Alternative Incentives: Introduce new reward mechanisms for subDAO users (e.g., increased staking rewards or additional governance perks) to offset their losses.
• Hybrid Model: Retain veCAKE partially while introducing voting power caps or quadratic voting to limit subDAO influence while preserving some benefits for users.
Conclusion
Indeed, for those not using subDAOs, this proposal offers reasons to support it as it could enhance CAKE’s value, but for subDAO users, opposition is natural due to the losses in revenue and influence. This divide is a critical discussion in determining PancakeSwap’s next direction—whether to prioritize token value or ecosystem diversity. If this proposal is put to a vote, a middle-ground solution that reconciles both sides could be key to gaining community support.
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People who lock their token forever on subdao is short term and people who not even lock are long term?? What are you talking about
Everyone forgets that this change is not from high inflation to 4% deflation. And the change from 2-3% deflation to 4% deflation and the murder of the most loyal community and the terrible centralization of the project
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I apologize if my previous response caused any confusion! It seems there might have been a misunderstanding in how I framed the perspectives of the two groups—those using subDAOs and those not using them—in relation to the Tokenomics 3.0 proposal. Your question highlights an important point: the idea of “short-term” and “long-term” might not align with locking tokens forever or not locking them at all in the way I described. Let me clarify and address your concern directly.
Revisiting the Context
You mentioned that people who don’t use subDAOs see the Tokenomics 3.0 proposal (eliminating veCAKE and reducing CAKE emissions) as a way to increase CAKE’s value and support it, while those using subDAOs oppose it due to losses. My earlier response interpreted this divide as a difference in priorities: subDAO users focusing on immediate benefits (like bribe rewards) and non-subDAO users focusing on CAKE’s future value. However, your question—“People who lock their tokens forever on subDAO is short-term and people who don’t even lock are long-term??”—suggests that my framing might not match the reality of token locking dynamics.
In PancakeSwap’s veCAKE system:
- Locking Tokens: Users lock CAKE to get veCAKE, and the longer the lock period (up to 4 years), the more voting power they gain. Some subDAO users might indeed lock their tokens for the maximum duration—essentially “forever” in a practical sense—to maximize voting power and rewards from Gauges Voting and bribes.
- Not Locking Tokens: People who don’t lock their CAKE (or don’t participate in veCAKE/subDAOs) hold liquid tokens without engaging in governance or earning those additional rewards.
If subDAO users are locking tokens for long periods, calling them “short-term” seems counterintuitive, as you’ve pointed out. Similarly, non-locking users being “long-term” doesn’t fully fit if they’re not committing to the ecosystem via locking. Let’s rethink this divide without forcing the short-term/long-term labels and focus on their actual incentives.
Corrected Perspective
The real difference between these groups isn’t necessarily about time horizons (short-term vs. long-term) but about how they derive value from CAKE and how the Tokenomics 3.0 proposal impacts them:
- SubDAO Users (Including Those Locking Tokens Forever)
- What They Do: They lock CAKE to get veCAKE, often for long periods (even up to 4 years), to gain voting power and direct CAKE emissions to subDAO-related pools. They also earn extra rewards from subDAO bribe markets (e.g., additional tokens like BNB or stablecoins).
- Why They Oppose Tokenomics 3.0: If veCAKE and Gauges Voting are removed, their locked tokens lose their voting utility, and the bribe reward system collapses. Even if they’ve locked tokens “forever” (or for years), the immediate loss of these benefits outweighs any potential long-term CAKE price increase, especially since their strategy relies on active participation in the current system.
- Their Focus: Maximizing ongoing rewards and influence within the veCAKE/subDAO framework, not necessarily short-term gains in a traditional sense.
- Non-SubDAO Users (Not Locking Tokens)
- What They Do: They hold CAKE without locking it into veCAKE or engaging with subDAOs. They might stake it elsewhere or simply hold it as a passive investment.
- Why They Support Tokenomics 3.0: Eliminating veCAKE and reducing emissions could make CAKE scarcer, potentially increasing its market value over time. Since they don’t rely on subDAO rewards or voting power, they aren’t hurt by the change and might benefit from a simpler, less inflationary system.
- Their Focus: CAKE’s token price appreciation, which could take time to materialize but doesn’t depend on active governance participation.
Addressing Your Confusion
You’re absolutely right to question the “short-term” and “long-term” labels I used earlier:
- SubDAO users locking forever aren’t short-term: Locking tokens for years is a long-term commitment. What I meant by “short-term” was their reliance on immediate, recurring rewards (bribes and emission allocations), which Tokenomics 3.0 would disrupt. Their strategy is long-term in commitment but oriented toward ongoing benefits, not just future token price gains.
- Non-locking users aren’t inherently long-term: Not locking tokens doesn’t necessarily mean they’re focused on the distant future—they could sell anytime. I labeled them “long-term” because they might benefit from CAKE’s value rising due to reduced supply, a process that unfolds over time.
I shouldn’t have tied the divide so strictly to timeframes. Instead, it’s about active reward-seeking (subDAO users) versus passive value appreciation (non-subDAO users).
What I Meant and What I Should’ve Said
I was trying to explain why these groups have opposing views on the proposal:
- SubDAO users (even those locking for years) lose their current income stream and influence, so they hate the change.
- Non-subDAO users (not locking) don’t lose anything and might gain from a higher CAKE price, so they like it.
I’m sorry for muddying the waters with the short-term/long-term framing—it didn’t capture the nuance of locking dynamics as you’ve rightly pointed out.
Does This Make Sense Now?
To rephrase without the confusing labels:
- People locking tokens for subDAOs (even permanently) oppose Tokenomics 3.0 because it kills their reward system and voting power, despite their long lock periods.
- People not locking tokens support it because it could boost CAKE’s value without affecting their current strategy.
Does this clarify things?
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The biggest issue is: why are locked veTokens (VE) allowed to vote on unlocking VE?
Isn’t this governance logic fundamentally flawed?
Wouldn’t a more reasonable approach be to stake and lock for 4 years and simultaneously cancel emissions?
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Recently, Binance integrated PancakeSwap swaps directly into its app, providing more than 268 million users with a simple and seamless way to interact with this decentralized protocol. This is truly an outstanding achievement by the team — another big step forward in the development of the entire BNB Smart Chain ecosystem.
PancakeSwap has been, is, and will remain the leading exchange protocol on BSC. And now, thanks to the same team that made this integration possible, we are on the verge of an important new chapter — a tokenomics upgrade.
I fully support this decision. I’m confident that a great future awaits us together with Binance.
The improvement of the CAKE token burn mechanism is another important move that will create additional buy pressure, helping to maintain and strengthen the token’s price stability. The more efficient the burn mechanism becomes, the more valuable each remaining token will be — and the team clearly understands this.
I would also like to suggest an idea that could further strengthen community trust: adding a real-time burn counter on the PancakeSwap homepage. Such a visual element would serve as a powerful symbol of transparency and progress. Binance once implemented a user counter on its homepage — and that played a key role in building its image and trust. I’m sure a similar step would benefit PancakeSwap as well.
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I just want hold CAKE no vCAKE, bCAKE, cCAKE or whatever equivalent. Just cake please. I see a lot of ppl advocating cakepie…what is that? Why some 3rd partie should parasiting on our ecosystem? Regarding gauges governance I stopped voting because had no effect just spending my time and fees. Once voting passes which is what I hope for after being holder since 2020 the price will drop by 20-30% and new fresh minds will be onboarded… those attracted by simplicity and clear rules and vision. Today 99% of ppl have no clue how tokenomics work. Why that? We keep playing in ecosystem which just does not work. Let’s change it.
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These are not some people from the outside, these are veCake holders who are united under the DAO. Nobody bothers you to keep just a cake. Now the team wants to gather an audience like you, which doesn’t even care about what’s going on and doesn’t even vote. So that they can centrally manage the “decentralized” platform.
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As an active CKP and mCake holder, I strongly support this tokenomics proposal. The current veCAKE system, particularly through partners like CakePie, has proven too complicated for average users and created more problems than benefits.
The CakePie peg issues have been concerning, with little transparency from the team when community members raise legitimate questions. When asking about implementation timelines for proposals like CIP #11, straightforward answers are rarely provided. The team’s slow implementation pace, combined with questionable voting practices involving MGP holdings, has undermined trust.
While some argue CakePie has benefited the community, my experience suggests otherwise. Deleting messages that question the peg on Telegram and telling users to “be more patient” after months of waiting isn’t building community - it’s eroding confidence.
This proposal’s simplification of tokenomics, unlocking of veCAKE, and more direct approach to emissions and burns addresses exactly what the ecosystem needs. True decentralization requires transparency and accessibility, not complexity that benefits only a few players.
I believe these changes will create a more sustainable and user-friendly PancakeSwap that stays true to DeFi’s core values.
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Lol sounds like a paid cheerleader comment. Couldn’t be further from the truth btw.
I strongly advise against that proposal.
I agree with many other comments and the flaws they pointed out in the way this proposal is conducted and the major hurting it will do to the loyal community. I’d like to throw in a few additional aspects:
Rushed Timing
As we eagerly wait for the Kitchen to launch v4, I am truly surprised about a Tokenomics Proposal and the timing of it. It dilutes roadmap focus (v4!), disrupts the well established model of today, and creates additional uncertainty at a time of market turbulence. If the Kitchen thinks that a better Tokenomics model is needed, this should be pushed out by at least 6 months to 1 year from now. The meantime could be utilized to refine the new model, hold a proper discussion, and include any new learnings from V4. Given all the negative comments against the proposed 3.0 Tokenomics, I would suggest to add this untertaking to “Q4 2025” in the 2025 roadmap.
Decentralization
I am somewhat shocked about the yesterday’s 25 M token lock and the possible implications, if true. If bad intent and manipulation hold true during any proposal vote, this would undermine the “D” in “DEX” so much that it would be beyond my belief, ever.
Partnerships
I keep it simple: as CZ said it, projects and ecosystems grow TOGETHER.
That said, I hope for this discussion to make clear that the negative outcome with regard to trust, community, partnership etc. will outweigh the positive expectations of any new model. No rush needed, let’s address this fair and in the future.
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the active “ckp holder” wants to make ckp equal to zero. Very funny, very realistic commentary.
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Exactly, I do not care and I´m not interested in governance, dao and other “benefits” of an over-complicated platform. No one really cares about cake virtual buble where guys like to pretend of having some governance and benefits. You are protecting your income, which is increasing inflation. We should stop free cake for 3rd parties and stop free cake for parasites. CAKE first, let´s make CAKE great again… 3rd partie will not do that, we need to cut them off. What is voting for? Go and vote in real world. Sometimes I feel like pancakeswap is being built by kids for kids. Too much noise and distraction lead to nowhere just the delusion of voting power governance. Clean the table and put only one thing in the middle…cake token and all should serve to it´s purpose not hurting or parasiting on it… yes this change will hurt temporarily because tokenomics 2.5 should never have come. As you see the decimal place 0.5 gives a clue was just some middle step, should be skipped and 3.0 be introduced instead of that, which hopefully will happen soon. The kids grew up, finally.
So the peg is back to 1:1 and the team is working hard? Wrong.
The peg is down day on day, we get no updates, not even to say what’s happening with CIP #11 - a user on Telegram found the contract manually, how is this transparent?