CAKE Tokenomics Proposal 3.0: True Ownership, Simplified Governance and Sustainable Growth

[NLP2510]

One question. What Will hapen if stake dao Pools? Will continue? Thanks

[game444]

I support the proposal, keep burn more cake, and suggest that after vecake retirement, deploy the auto cake vault that have “APY and Cake Point” please check the pic example:

[Bethoveen]

Comment on the Proposal to Eliminate the Venomics System in PancakeSwap

As an active member of the PancakeSwap community, I strongly oppose the proposal to eliminate the venomics system and replace it with a centralized burn-based model. This change not only undermines decentralization but also jeopardizes the intrinsic value of CAKE and the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem. Below are the key points that support this position:

1. The current locking system (venomics) is effective and decentralized: Unlike the proposed model—which allows centralized actors to lock CAKE temporarily and vote without real commitment—the current venomics system ensures that governance power comes from long-term stakers. This aligns incentives between users and the protocol. The new model removes penalties and opens the door to governance manipulation with zero long-term exposure.

2. Eliminating CAKE’s intrinsic value: Under venomics, CAKE has utility and value through governance rights. Removing this system turns CAKE into a purely speculative asset, its price driven only by expectations of future burns. This strips away its fundamental purpose and turns it into something no different from a memecoin.

3. Burning is overvalued and inefficient at higher prices: While CAKE at $1.70 can be considered deflationary under the proposed model, our analysis shows that once CAKE surpasses ~$5, the burn mechanism is no longer sufficient to offset supply pressures. This drastically reduces the potential for a sustainable flywheel. In contrast, venomics enables a deflationary cycle fueled by DEX volume and incentivized long-term locking.

4. Loss of ecosystem diversity: Removing low-cap token pools will reduce the diversity and innovation within PancakeSwap. It discourages new projects from building here and shrinks trading volume. With no viable incentive to enter, future top-tier projects will choose other ecosystems. Venomics fosters growth and broad participation, fueling organic volume and ecosystem expansion.

5. Frequent tokenomics changes destroy trust: Changing CAKE’s economic model every year introduces instability and deters serious investors. No one wants to hold a token that can be fundamentally changed overnight.

6. Immediate price collapse from increased supply: This proposal would instantly release up to 79 million CAKE into circulation, which would trigger a sharp drop in price. Burns alone cannot keep up with this influx—not in the short term nor over several years.

7. Real-world success of venomics: Protocols like Curve have proven that venomics-based models are up to 3x more effective than burn-only systems. Curve has operated for over four years with this model, achieving sustained growth, user retention, and volume generation.

8. Destruction of ecosystem projects: Projects such as Cakepie, Listadao, Astherus, and StakeDAO rely on synthetic derivatives of CAKE. This change would wipe them out overnight without warning, discouraging future innovation and community development.

Conclusion: This proposal is not beneficial in the short or long term. It undermines decentralization, strips CAKE of its utility, and prevents the ecosystem from achieving sustainable growth. Instead of destroying venomics, we should be enhancing it—building a flywheel driven by real volume, long-term commitment, and community governance.

[Cakepie]

We at Cakepie are deeply troubled by PancakeSwap’s Tokenomics Proposal 3.0, specifically the proposed retirement of veCAKE. As the largest and most dedicated veCAKE holder, we were blindsided by this decision—learning about it at the same time as the rest of the community. After our continuous support and consistent contributions, this abrupt shift feels deeply misaligned with the mutual trust we’ve worked hard to establish.

Sunsetting veCAKE would be devastating for Cakepie and for every project built on long-term alignment with PancakeSwap. Our entire ecosystem is structured around veCAKE, with millions of CAKE locked for four years as a clear show of commitment. Removing veCAKE would erase that commitment overnight and undermine the trust and efforts of all builders who believed in PancakeSwap’s vision.

This move also sets a dangerous precedent in decentralized governance: even those who commit resources and dedication long-term risk having foundational rules changed abruptly, without prior consultation or community dialogue, leaving loyal stakeholders unfairly penalized.

Key Risks of Sunsetting veCAKE

Removing veCAKE introduces significant risks to PancakeSwap’s ecosystem and long-term sustainability. Here are key points raised by community members in the forum, highlighting thoughtful user-driven concerns:

• Damaged Trust: Severely undermines the confidence of protocols currently building on PancakeSwap, discouraging future integrations.

• Loss of Voting Incentives: Eliminates substantial co-incentives and voting rewards activities from projects engaging directly with veCAKE voters.

• Reduced Appeal for New Protocols: PancakeSwap would lose its competitive advantage as the go-to DEX for new protocol token launches and incentivized pools—Uniswap and others become more attractive alternatives.

• Lost Revenue for CAKE Holders: Removes a crucial revenue stream directly benefiting long-term CAKE stakeholders.

• Increased Sell Pressure and Volatility: Eliminates a mechanism that effectively aligns holders’ long-term interests, significantly increasing risk of immediate token dumping once tokens unlock.

• Erosion of Decentralized Governance: Removes the unique weighting-by-time governance system, which empowered committed long-term holders over short-term large holders, handing excessive influence to whales.

• Unsustainable Burn Model: A burn-only mechanism struggles with scalability as the price of CAKE increases, since the same volume will burn fewer tokens. In contrast, the veCAKE model becomes more effective at higher prices, attracting more bribes from ecosystem projects and better aligning incentives for long-term holders.

We understand that the veCAKE model isn’t perfect and could benefit from thoughtful improvements. However, scrapping it entirely feels both unnecessary and unfair to long-term supporters. There are more balanced ways to improve efficiency and fairness without hurting those who have shown lasting commitment.

Some practical alternatives include:

• Cap emissions to low-volume pools: Redirect rewards toward high-volume pools that genuinely drive activity and create tangible value for the ecosystem.

• Reward Voters with Fee Sharing: Allocate a portion of the fees generated by a pool to veCAKE holders who vote for that pool. This incentivizes directing emissions toward pools with higher trading volumes.

• Introduce Exit Flexibility with Penalties: Enhance veCAKE’s design by allowing early exits with penalties. These penalties could be burned or redistributed, offering users more flexibility while preserving the tokenomics integrity.

These solutions demonstrate that addressing PancakeSwap’s efficiency concerns does not require the drastic step of dismantling veCAKE. Cakepie remains fully committed and eager to collaborate on enhancing veTokenomics in ways that preserve community-driven governance and long-term value.

We also have serious concerns regarding the integrity of the governance process itself. On-chain evidence indicates that approximately 25 million CAKE tokens were suddenly locked across multiple wallets immediately prior to this proposal’s announcement. Such behavior strongly suggests an orchestrated governance attack intended to manipulate the outcome by stacking votes while being able to unlock those tokens immediately if the proposal passes. This raises alarming questions about fairness, transparency, and the decentralization principles PancakeSwap was built upon. A compromised governance process undermines trust and must not be overlooked.

Cakepie’s track record shows our strong commitment to PancakeSwap and the wider BNB Chain community. We’ve locked 13 million CAKE, helped grow liquidity, supported better yields for users, and worked directly with protocols to bring their liquidity and voting incentives to the PancakeSwap ecosystem — all made possible through veTokenomics. Everything we’ve done is rooted in our belief in community ownership, decentralization, and long-term, sustainable growth. This proposal profoundly hurts because it undermines these core values and threatens to erode community trust.

We strongly urge the #DeFi and #BNBChain communities to join us in opposing PancakeSwap’s Tokenomics Proposal 3.0. This decision impacts every long-term builder and holder who has invested time, resources, and trust into PancakeSwap’s ecosystem. We call upon PancakeSwap’s leadership to reconnect with the project’s foundational principles, reconsider the abandonment of veCAKE, and engage openly with the builders and community members who have consistently supported its growth.

[Grimmace]

(Reserved for future use)

[Radovan]

Nice and now go and compare, pick the best of the best from competitors like uni, ray, jup, orca, crv (you mentioned venomics), pump, aerodrome etc… the majority of them has no lock. What´s more… the modern world likes freedom, US guys will never lock their tokens and loose the control, same EU and other civilised countries who fighting for centuries for their freedom. This venomics model will just not work for them. Stop advocating it as it is a modern world invention. Actually, it is the worst thing cake introduced so far. Hope we can get rid of it soon. The utility of cake is cake itself. It´s like company share… you do not need to use your shares for something… you holding them and that should be enough, right? The conservative investors…those who earn a lot are too busy to participate in the ecosystem actively, they just want to hold the share of that company, growing company value = growing share… simple like. Why trying to reinvent the wheel? Just one token, simple as that. You buy or go. We should stop overthinking as for the last 4y was one great idea followed by another one… and the price of the token plummeted by 90%. Congrats, overthinkers and reinventers.

[Hubert]

@Muz_FE

This is what that new proposal is about as mentionned below

Hey, thanks for your answer.
I understand it’s the goal. What I am saying is that the proposed solution is not a good solution, for many reasons. Two of them are the following:
1st: we are supposed to be in DeFi. Changing tokenomics to go from a fairly decentralised model to a fully centralised one is bad, destroys trust, and is quite dangerous from a regulatory/legal perspective
2nd: changing tokenomics every other day is terrible. Projects who build on PCS are getting destroyed. Reputation is important. If PCS was to pursue, a compensation plan would be needed.

There are many other ways to achieve the goal of directing rewards towards efficient pools, while not changing drastically the tokenomics like reducing the emission cap for low revenue pools or directing a portion of fees to bribes.

Looks like the problem here is elsewhere. The weird 25m lock right before the proposal is probably linked to the reason the proposal is shipped. It would be interesting to understand the real motives behind this proposal from the team.

[Cakeboy]

CONGRATULATIONS CAKE TEAM. This is the best proposal you’ve made. The value of cake will skyrocket. Let’s do it. East to achieve 10B Market Cap.

[Cakeboy]

I love it. Let’s do it.

[phn1990]

I strongly oppose this.

1. The bribing system allocates rewards inefficiently, over-rewarding low-volume pools while high-volume pools receive fewer rewards. => Removing this system immediately will destroy the trust of builders and the community. No decentralized partner will want to collaborate with a project that behaves like this. I have two suggestions:

• Cap the allocation of a pool based on its volume. For example, if a pool contributes 0.3% of volume, cap its emission at 0.6% (i.e., 0.3% × 2), or something similar to reduce the emission.
• Allocate 50% of the emissions to the bribe market and 50% through direct management.

2. Revenue sharing is an essential part of any DeFi platform.
   Many platforms already implement this model. I’m even building a platform that shares 100% of its profit with holders/stakers. If this passes, PCS will be left behind, and soon, $CAKE will drop dramatically.

• The proposed change increases the burn rate for these pools from 10% to 15%. Since the 0.01% and 0.05% pools on CAKE v3 account for a significant portion of overall trading volume, this change will accelerate CAKE deflation.
  → In my experience, the total revenue shared is around 10–15k CPW, or ~700k CPY — too small to make an impact.
• The revenue sharing should be paid in BNB (like how Pendle does), instead of CAKE. This would eliminate the sell pressure on CAKE from this revenue stream.

3. IMPORTANT:
   The proposal cuts CAKE emissions and reduces the benefits for current stakers, yet provides no information about revenue. The platform must use profits to help support the CAKE price.

• Instead of removing revenue sharing, just use a part of the profit to buy back and burn. That would help. I don’t believe that the PCS still don’t have profit for now.

[akiyama2333]

Indeed, the ideal of decentralized governance is that power should not be concentrated in the hands of a few but distributed widely across the community. Let’s organize this situation and consider some ideas to promote decentralization.

Current Situation

PancakeSwap introduced veCAKE (vote-escrowed CAKE) in 2023. This is a mechanism where CAKE tokens are locked for a certain period to gain voting rights, with longer lock periods increasing voting power (the amount of veCAKE). The system aims to encourage long-term commitment while strengthening participation in governance. Additionally, through the “Gauges Voting” mechanism, veCAKE holders can decide the allocation of CAKE emissions (determining how much reward is assigned to which liquidity pool).

However, as you’ve noted, if voting power is concentrated in subDAOs (e.g., related projects like Cakepie or Stake DAO), this could be due to the following factors:

1. Influence of Large Holders: Since veCAKE voting power depends on the amount and duration of locked CAKE, “whales” who can lock large amounts of CAKE for extended periods hold significant influence.
2. SubDAO Incentive Design: The rewards offered by subDAOs (e.g., additional token rewards in bribe markets) are attractive, leading veCAKE holders to concentrate their votes on subDAO-related gauges.
3. Participation Barriers: Small-scale holders lack the motivation or knowledge to participate in voting, resulting in power being skewed toward subDAOs or active players.

This could create a risk where the growth of PancakeSwap’s entire ecosystem becomes overly dependent on the interests or direction of subDAOs.

Issues Hindering Decentralization

Regarding how the concentration of voting power in subDAOs might be stifling growth, the following impacts are conceivable:

• Liquidity Pool Imbalance: Major trading pairs or new project pools may not receive sufficient CAKE rewards, making it harder to attract liquidity providers.
• Dilution of Community Voice: With subDAOs taking the lead, the opinions of regular CAKE holders are less reflected, potentially reducing trust in the project as a decentralized entity.
• Reduced Ecosystem Diversity: Over-reliance on subDAOs could limit PancakeSwap’s own innovation or its ability to collaborate with external projects.

Solutions for Decentralization

To address this issue and make PancakeSwap’s governance more decentralized, the following approaches could be considered:

1. Voting Power Caps
   Set an upper limit on the voting power a single address or subDAO can hold. For example, no single entity can exceed 10% of the total voting power, regardless of their veCAKE holdings. This curbs the influence of large holders while encouraging participation from smaller holders.
2. Quadratic Voting Introduction
   Adopt a system where voting power is calculated based on the square root of token holdings. This prevents a small number of large holders from wielding overwhelming influence and makes it easier for more participants’ opinions to be reflected.
3. Incentives for Small Holders
   Increase the benefits of voting for users with small amounts of veCAKE. For instance, distribute small CAKE rewards to all voters or add an option to gain voting rights with shorter lock periods.
4. Reevaluation of SubDAO Roles
   While the bribe markets provided by subDAOs generate additional revenue, they may be contributing to voting bias. Limiting the influence of bribes or increasing the proportion of gauges directly managed by PancakeSwap could reduce dependence on subDAOs.
5. Community Education and Tool Improvement
   Simplify the voting process with UI enhancements or expand governance tutorials to encourage broader user participation. The current Gauges Voting system requires technical understanding, which might be deterring small holders.
6. Tokenomics Overhaul
   In fact, as confirmed by posts on X, PancakeSwap announced a “CAKE Tokenomics 3.0” proposal on April 8, 2025 (today’s date). This proposal aims to eliminate veCAKE and Gauges Voting, reduce CAKE emissions, and target an annual deflation rate of about 4%. If implemented, this could fundamentally resolve the issue of voting power concentration in subDAOs. However, the broader impact of this change on the ecosystem remains under discussion.

Impact on Growth and Outlook

There’s certainly merit to the idea that dependence on subDAOs is hindering growth. If subDAOs prioritize their own interests over improving PancakeSwap’s overall liquidity or user experience, the ecosystem’s expansion could stall. On the other hand, subDAOs also play a role in fostering external project partnerships and revenue opportunities, so rather than eliminating them entirely, striking a balance is key.

For example, combining the veCAKE and subDAO mechanisms with the decentralization measures above could allow PancakeSwap to maintain growth momentum while achieving fairer governance. Alternatively, if bold reforms like Tokenomics 3.0 gain community support, they could radically resolve the voting concentration issue and usher in a new growth phase.

Conclusion

Currently, it’s clear that the introduction of veCAKE has led to voting power concentration in subDAOs, resulting in insufficient decentralization. To address this, measures like voting power limits, incentive redesign, and community participation promotion are effective. Additionally, if the latest Tokenomics 3.0 proposal is implemented, the issue itself could be resolved. To maximize PancakeSwap’s growth, a mechanism that reflects the broader community’s voice while coexisting with subDAOs is essential.

[Dayronpro]

I just want to think that this proposal has many things linked where some will be approved because they make sense and others will not. How is it possible that investors in a protocol have some kind of commitment when they block themselves today to vote tomorrow and if I want to next month I unblock myself or better yet we all unblock as if nothing happened … that is tremendous garbage you must have a commitment to your protocol for that is VeTokenomics and to protect the governance of the protocol. How is it possible that the main DEFI protocols in the industry have Vtokenomic and are successful and at this point 2025 Pancakeswap and says it wants to remove it, well they know they are killing protocols in its ecosystem. like Cakepie, StakeDao, Athereus, which is even in Hong Kong with you right now, hahaha … What happens is it necessary to kill CAKEPIE because it seized 50% of the cakes? Protocol that you accepted, I know the history of Cakepie well and I also saw the birth of Pancake in 2020. I was an investor in Pancake. I never thought I would write this to this protocol. I think the people in charge don’t know how to steer this ship.

[Juapia]

If someone just wants to buy cake and hold it, the veCAKE system doesn’t stop them from doing so.

I don’t see why we need to end a system that favors long-term holders to favor those who just want to buy and have cake. Well, if you just want to buy and hold cake in your wallet, just buy and holde it in your wallet. Dont lock.

But ignoring those who held for 4 years and receive a token dump as a reward is tough.

[Dayronpro]

A few words are enough

[cf123321]

seems they don’t want use nay income ,

[Age4]

Cakepie’s mcap is 5m USD right now..are you sure they have %50 of cakes?..and if there is a problem with Cakepie and Pancakeswap, devs shouldnt play with entire mechanism of the protocol to beat Cakepie..if this is the case i think CZ should involve and resolve entire problem for once and all otherwise if team focuses on strategies to fight with Cakepie instead of maintaining sustainable growth of $Cake, they may change everything every year..it cant go like this..if Cakepie seized too much cake and ruined financial ecosystem of $Cake, then Pancakeswap or CZ should buyback excessive cakes OTC with a fair price that Cakepie would agree and move on, otherwise both Cakepie and Pancakeswap will lose at the end. Solana already surpassed Binance Smart Chain in terms of mcap usage and profit so CZ shouldnt let biggest DEFI of BSC die like this

[drew019]

This isn’t an upgrade — it’s a public execution. You’re killing Cakepie because you’re uncomfortable with a community-driven protocol holding real power over CAKE. Simplification? No. This is centralized control dressed up as progress.

veCAKE was a promise of governance, and now you want to destroy it because you can’t control the ones who accumulated it with vision and strategy. You’re not proposing Tokenomics 3.0 — you’re wiping the board clean to keep all the pieces.

Worst part? You’re killing a protocol that helped PancakeSwap grow, just because it no longer serves your agenda. That’s not DeFi. That’s financial cowardice disguised as innovation.

If this passes, the community will know who’s here for the ecosystem — and who’s just here to own the cake."

[drew019]

If you pass this proposal as it is, you’re sending one loud message to the entire ecosystem:

“It doesn’t matter how much you contribute — if you gain power, we’ll erase you.”

Cakepie played by your rules.
They accumulated veCAKE, brought liquidity, attracted users, and helped strengthen your protocol.
And now, because their influence grew, you want them gone?

Think carefully, because here’s what’s coming:

1. Total loss of trust in governance. No one will commit long-term if you change the rules whenever it suits you.

2. Massive CAKE dump. If holders feel powerless, they will leave. Period.

3. Slow death of your ecosystem. Builders won’t build on a foundation that gets torn down from the top.

4. DeFi isolation. Other protocols will watch how you treat allies — and they won’t risk being next.

Is centralizing power really worth destroying your future?
You can keep the cake… but it’ll taste like betrayal.

[Sebv24]

Strongly disagree. Ve tokenomics ensure a healthy grow and decision making in pancakeswap while it rewards long term and loyal holders that deposit their trust in pancake by giving them the power to vote for their company future and progress. This model also provides the cake token stability by having the locks. Do anyone thinks it is fair that for example I got a significant amount of cake, there is an important proposal and I only lock my tokens for that proposal then I unblock and sell? No, holders locked for a considerable amount of time are the ones that should have the benefit and power of voting because they are the ones compromised to the long term stability and grow of pancakeswap. If this new tokenomics are implemented it will have a very negative effect and will result in an considerable amount of loss in holders and trust in investors. Please just make things right and stay in the ve model.

[Sebv24]

I cant believe I’m seeing such a low caliber movement from pancake team