I apologize if my previous response caused any confusion! It seems there might have been a misunderstanding in how I framed the perspectives of the two groups—those using subDAOs and those not using them—in relation to the Tokenomics 3.0 proposal. Your question highlights an important point: the idea of “short-term” and “long-term” might not align with locking tokens forever or not locking them at all in the way I described. Let me clarify and address your concern directly.
Revisiting the Context
You mentioned that people who don’t use subDAOs see the Tokenomics 3.0 proposal (eliminating veCAKE and reducing CAKE emissions) as a way to increase CAKE’s value and support it, while those using subDAOs oppose it due to losses. My earlier response interpreted this divide as a difference in priorities: subDAO users focusing on immediate benefits (like bribe rewards) and non-subDAO users focusing on CAKE’s future value. However, your question—“People who lock their tokens forever on subDAO is short-term and people who don’t even lock are long-term??”—suggests that my framing might not match the reality of token locking dynamics.
In PancakeSwap’s veCAKE system:
- Locking Tokens: Users lock CAKE to get veCAKE, and the longer the lock period (up to 4 years), the more voting power they gain. Some subDAO users might indeed lock their tokens for the maximum duration—essentially “forever” in a practical sense—to maximize voting power and rewards from Gauges Voting and bribes.
- Not Locking Tokens: People who don’t lock their CAKE (or don’t participate in veCAKE/subDAOs) hold liquid tokens without engaging in governance or earning those additional rewards.
If subDAO users are locking tokens for long periods, calling them “short-term” seems counterintuitive, as you’ve pointed out. Similarly, non-locking users being “long-term” doesn’t fully fit if they’re not committing to the ecosystem via locking. Let’s rethink this divide without forcing the short-term/long-term labels and focus on their actual incentives.
Corrected Perspective
The real difference between these groups isn’t necessarily about time horizons (short-term vs. long-term) but about how they derive value from CAKE and how the Tokenomics 3.0 proposal impacts them:
- SubDAO Users (Including Those Locking Tokens Forever)
- What They Do: They lock CAKE to get veCAKE, often for long periods (even up to 4 years), to gain voting power and direct CAKE emissions to subDAO-related pools. They also earn extra rewards from subDAO bribe markets (e.g., additional tokens like BNB or stablecoins).
- Why They Oppose Tokenomics 3.0: If veCAKE and Gauges Voting are removed, their locked tokens lose their voting utility, and the bribe reward system collapses. Even if they’ve locked tokens “forever” (or for years), the immediate loss of these benefits outweighs any potential long-term CAKE price increase, especially since their strategy relies on active participation in the current system.
- Their Focus: Maximizing ongoing rewards and influence within the veCAKE/subDAO framework, not necessarily short-term gains in a traditional sense.
- Non-SubDAO Users (Not Locking Tokens)
- What They Do: They hold CAKE without locking it into veCAKE or engaging with subDAOs. They might stake it elsewhere or simply hold it as a passive investment.
- Why They Support Tokenomics 3.0: Eliminating veCAKE and reducing emissions could make CAKE scarcer, potentially increasing its market value over time. Since they don’t rely on subDAO rewards or voting power, they aren’t hurt by the change and might benefit from a simpler, less inflationary system.
- Their Focus: CAKE’s token price appreciation, which could take time to materialize but doesn’t depend on active governance participation.
Addressing Your Confusion
You’re absolutely right to question the “short-term” and “long-term” labels I used earlier:
- SubDAO users locking forever aren’t short-term: Locking tokens for years is a long-term commitment. What I meant by “short-term” was their reliance on immediate, recurring rewards (bribes and emission allocations), which Tokenomics 3.0 would disrupt. Their strategy is long-term in commitment but oriented toward ongoing benefits, not just future token price gains.
- Non-locking users aren’t inherently long-term: Not locking tokens doesn’t necessarily mean they’re focused on the distant future—they could sell anytime. I labeled them “long-term” because they might benefit from CAKE’s value rising due to reduced supply, a process that unfolds over time.
I shouldn’t have tied the divide so strictly to timeframes. Instead, it’s about active reward-seeking (subDAO users) versus passive value appreciation (non-subDAO users).
What I Meant and What I Should’ve Said
I was trying to explain why these groups have opposing views on the proposal:
- SubDAO users (even those locking for years) lose their current income stream and influence, so they hate the change.
- Non-subDAO users (not locking) don’t lose anything and might gain from a higher CAKE price, so they like it.
I’m sorry for muddying the waters with the short-term/long-term framing—it didn’t capture the nuance of locking dynamics as you’ve rightly pointed out.
Does This Make Sense Now?
To rephrase without the confusing labels:
- People locking tokens for subDAOs (even permanently) oppose Tokenomics 3.0 because it kills their reward system and voting power, despite their long lock periods.
- People not locking tokens support it because it could boost CAKE’s value without affecting their current strategy.
Does this clarify things?